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THE EXTENSION OF UNITED STATES
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION TO OUTER SPACE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the near future, increasing numbers of people will be
shuttled into space for extended periods of time. Astronauts,
scientists, technicians, and researchers of diverse training and
national origin will comprise teams of spacefarers sent aloft to
determine the resources and habitability of outer space. With
such missions underway, specialists in space law have ex-
pressed concern over suggestions by behaviorists that some in-
dividuals may lose psychological equilibrium during flights of
long duration.1 Space travel presents problems of cramped liv-
ing quarters, continuous work demands, and a hostile environ-
ment immediately exterior to the spacecraft. These conditions
are expected to create sufficient strain to touch off surprising
and possibly explosive behavioral responses,2 in addition to
the usual sorts of criminal behavior mankind typically
demonstrates.
Recently, Congress passed into law an amendment3 to the
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*Funds for support of this study have been allocated by the NASA-Ames
Research Center, Moffett Field, California, under Interchange No. NCA2 0R685-202.
1. G. ROBINSON, LIVING IN OUTER SPACE 86-87 (1975).
2. See generally id. (citing The Problem of Sensory Deprivation in Space
Medicine, 1 KOSMICHESKAYA BIIOLOGIYA I MEDITSINA, vol. 4, at 1-8 (1967)); Sells,
Emerging Problems of Human Adaptability to Military Flying Missions (June 5-6,
1956) (paper presented to the Human Factors Technical Symposium, Chicago, Illi-
nois); Wheaton, Fact and Fantasy in Isolation and Sensory Deprivation (Report to
the School of Aviation Medicine, Randolph, Texas 1968).
3. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, Pub. L.
No. 97-96, § 6, 95 Stat. 1210 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 7(6) (West Supp.
1981)) [hereinafter cited as the Amendment]. The amendment extends special mari-
time and territorial jurisdiction of the United States to include:
Any vehicle used or designed for flight or navigation in space and
on the registry of the United States pursuant to the Treaty on Princi-
ples Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
while that vehicle is in flight, which is from the moment when all exter-
nal doors are closed on Earth following embarkation until the moment
when one such door is opened on Earth for disembarkation or in the
case of a forced landing, until the competent authorities take over the
627
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Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction Act4 in order to
extend United States criminal jurisdiction to reach certain
acts committed in outer space. This new addition provides
that the courts of the United States may exercise jurisdiction
over crimes committed onboard space vehicles.
Unfortunately, the Amendment'is inadequate and confus-
ing. This comment will demonstrate that the language of the
law as enacted will present numerous problems of interpreta-
responsibility for the vehicle and for persons and property aboard.
4. 18 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 1981). The entire current statute, with the Amend-
ment appearing as subsection (6), reads as follows:
Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States defined
The term "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States," as used in this title includes:
(1) The high seas, any other waters within the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of
any particular State, and any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the
United States or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or
under the laws of the United States, or of any State, Territory, District,
or possession thereof, when such vessel is within the admiralty and mar-
itime jurisdiction of the U.S.
(2) Any vessel registered, licensed, or enrolled under the laws of
the United States, and being on a voyage upon the waters of any of the
Great Lakes, or any of the waters connecting them, or upon the Saint
Lawrence River where the same constitutes the International Boundary
Line.
(3) Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United
States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any
place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent
of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erec-
tion of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building.
(4) Any island, rock, or key containing deposits of guano, which
may, at the discretion of the President, be considered as appertaining to
the United States.
(5) Any aircraft belonging in whole or in part to the United
States, or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or under
the laws of the United States, or any State, Territory, District, or pos-
session thereof, while such aircraft is in flight over the high seas, or over
any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state.
(6) Any vehicle used or designed for flight or navigation in space
and on the registry of the United States pursuant to the Treaty on Prin-
ciples Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
while that vehicle is in flight, which is from the moment when all exter-
nal doors are closed on Earth following embarkation until the moment
when one such door is opened on Earth for disembarkation or in the
case of a forced landing, until the competent authorities take over the
responsibility for the vehicle and for persons and property aboard.
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tion for the courts and that the law's overall approach to pro-
viding for jurisdiction in space is fundamentally incorrect.
The critique begins with a review of the traditional principles
of criminal jurisdiction in order to show that they are inap-
propriate jurisdictional formulas in the context of outer space.
The discussion will suggest the variety of factors a statement
of jurisdiction must comprehend to be suitable for application
to outer space. Next, it will reveal, through detailed analysis
of the Amendment, that the present grant of extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction contains shortcomings as serious as those
of the traditional jurisdictional principles. In conclusion, it
will argue that jurisdiction should be determined by applica-
tion of the concept of minimum contacts, a superior approach
which could be tailored to provide criminal jurisdiction in the
res nullius, or res communis, space environment inhabited by
mixed groups of nationals.
II. THE TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Historically, courts have recognized various principles to
govern the proper exercise of jurisdiction over criminal mat-
ters. In 1935, a comprehensive study known as the Harvard
Research on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime5 identified
the usual principles which serve as bases for asserting jurisdic-
tion. The four principles are as follows: the territorial princi-
ple,6 the nationality principle,7 the protective principle, 8 and
the universality principle." A fifth jurisdictional basis, the pas-
sive personality principle, has also come into recognition. 10
Most commonly used is the territorial principle, which al-
lows a state to exercise jurisdiction over acts occurring wholly
or partly within its territory, regardless of the actor's nation-
ality.1 Second in prevalence is the nationality principle,
5. Harvard Research on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L.
Supp. 435 (1935).
6. Id. at 480.
7. Id. at 519.
8. Id. at 543.
9. Id. at 563.
10. The passive personality principle is described in S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD,
THE LAW RELATING TO ACTIVITIES OF MAN IN SPACE 55 (1970), and in Sloup, Legal
Regime of International Space Flight: Criminal Jurisdiction and Command Author-
ity Aboard the Space Shuttle/Skylab, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST COLLO-
QUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 148 (1978).
11. See S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 10, at 55 n. 143 (citing to Ameri-
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which allows a state to exercise jurisdiction over acts commit-
ted by its own nationals, regardless of where the act is com-
mitted.12 Next is the protective principle, recently applied
with greater frequency, which allows a state to exercise juris-
diction over acts having a substantial effect on the interests of
the state.'" Fourth in prevalence is the universality principle,
which allows a state to exercise jurisdiction over universally
condemned crimes, regardless of where or by whom the crime
was committed." Last is the passive personality principle,
which permits a state to exercise jurisdiction over an act com-
mitted abroad by a foreigner, if the act substantially affects
the person or property of a citizen of the state."
A. The Territorial Principle
The United States courts tenaciously adhere to the terri-
torial principle, 6 which had its beginnings in the birth of the
Renaissance state in the 17th century.' 7 As the concept of sov-
ereignty grew, criminal jurisdiction began to be based on the
principle of territoriality. At that time, it was reasonable for
the state within whose boundaries the crime was committed to
assume jurisdiction, since there was little international mobil-
ity and the actor was likely to be present in the very place the
act was planned, executed, and received."8 Today, in the con-
text of an extraterrestrial and international setting, the terri-
can Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909)); Schooner Exchange v. Mc-
Fadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 6, 136 (1812).
12. See S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 10 at 55 n.143 (citing Kawakita v.
United States, 343 U.S. 717, 732 (1952); Skiriotes v. Fla., 313 U.S. 69 (1941); Black-
mer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); Cook v. Talt, 265 U.S. 47 (1924); United
States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 84 (1922)).
13. See S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 10, at 55 n.145 (citing United
States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960), aff'd, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.
1961)).
14. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED)
§ 404 (Tent. Draft No. 2) (1981).
15. See The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, no. 10.
16. "For historical reasons, which have been incorporated in the constitutional
system, and on account of the influence of arguments drawn from the nature of sover-
eignty, American law strongly emphasizes the territorial element." Preuss, American
Conception of Jurisdiction with Respect to Conflicts of Law on Crime, 30 TRANS
GROTIUS SOC'Y 184, 198 (1944).
17. See Sarkar, The Proper Law of Crime in International Law, in INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 50 (1965).
18. Id.
[Vol. 23
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torial principle is somewhat obsolete."9
The application of the territorial principle initially
presents the difficulty of there being no international agree-
ment over what constitutes the place called "outer space" be-
cause the outer perimeter of a nation's territorial airspace is
not precisely defined.20 Several theorists have advanced no-
tions for delimiting the frontier between airspace and outer
space.21 Nonetheless, neither a technical nor political defini-
tion has gained general acceptance.2 2 The reluctance to deter-
mine the border indicates a conscious restraint by nations
from making sovereign claims to outer space. 3 Nations have
considered the airspace above them as their own territory
since the end of World War I.2" But attempts to project sover-
eign claims into outer space on the same basis have been re-
jected by the international community.25 The recent Outer
Space Treaty, signed in 1967, shows that nations concur that
19. "Despite the prevalence of the territorial concept of jurisdiction in our juris-
prudence, studies of international law . . . indicate that as a statement of the entire
international law of jurisdiction it is inadequate." United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F.
Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
20. Indicative of this are the following remarks by then United States Ambassa-
dor to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson: "[W]e have not attempted to define
whether outer space begins. In our judgment it is premature to do this now. The
attempt to draw a boundary between airspace and outer space must await further
experience and a consensus among the nations." Address by Ambassador Stevenson
to the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Dec. 4, 1961)
(full text reproduced in 46 Dept. State Bulletin No. 1179, 180, 181 (Jan. 29, 1962)).
21. The definitions of outer space run the gamut. Some are: The height at
which humans can live without artificial breathing apparatus; the maximum height to
which aircraft can ascend; altitude beyond that at which conventional aircraft fly; the
base of the exosphere (about 300-500 miles above earth's surface); the Von Karman
line; the volume of space between the surface of the earth at sea level and an altitude
of 80,000 meters above it. For a full exposition, see generally S. LAY & H.
TAUBENFELD, supra note 10, at 39-48.
22. See id.
2.3. "It is clear from the outset that, despite suggestions of many commentators,
the states, at least the major powers, have been quite unready to set limits by altitude
to their claims to sovereign right." Id. at 40.
24. "The proof of the military utility of aircraft in the First World War, com-
bined with the demands of economic nationalism, led to universal agreement that
each state had absolute sovereignty in the airspace above its territory." Id. at 37.
25. "[T]he official position of all major states, including the two major space
powers, and the overwhelming majority of writers flatly reject claims to unlimited
sovereignty [overhead]." Id. at 52.
26. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967. 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, U.N.T.S. No. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space
Treaty].
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
"outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is
not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty,
by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. '27
It becomes apparent that it is neither logical nor politi-
cally viable for the United States to treat acts committed in
space as acts occurring in its own territory. Use of the territo-
rial principle to* gain jurisdiction over criminal acts in space is
not appropriate since the borders of space are still undefined,
and the United States has agreed that space may not be ap-
propriated as territory.2 8
Courts have, on occasion, applied the territorial principle
expansively to find jurisdiction over criminal acts which oc-
curred in territory outside the United States, but which have
affected United States' interests.2 A court may do this by rea-
soning either that one element of the crime, however trivial,
was committed in the United States or by reasoning that a
crime affecting the United States can be treated as if one of
its elements was committed domestically." In the latter case,
it is noticeable that what the courts call an elasticization of
the territorial principle is essentially a restatement of the pro-
tective principle.3 1
Modification of the territorial principle arose because the
territorial principle is too narrow a doctrine to take account of
complex foreign elements in crimes. 2 However, there is a rec-
27. 18 U.S.T. 2410, at 2413.
28. See supra note 26, at art. II.
29. See Sakar, supra note 17, at 50.
30. Some American jurisdictions purposefully inhibit the tendency to stretch
the territorial principle. One example is California, where one court held that:
Though Pen. Code, § 27, subd. (1), provides for punishing persons who
commit, in whole or in part any crime within the state, and Pen. Code, §
778a, states that a person is punishable if, with intent to commit a
crime, he does any act within this state in execution or part execution or
such intent, which culminates in the commission of a crime either within
or without the state, both sections are construed as requiring the doing,
in California, of an act amounting to an "attempt" to commit the of-
fense charged, within the definition of attempt in criminal cases gener-
ally-i.e., there must be acts beyond mere preparation.
People v. Utter, 24 Cal. App. 3d 535, 101 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1972).
31. That is, the state can exercise jurisdiction over acts having an effect on the
state. However, the decisions following this line of reasoning by relying on territorial
language are regarded as exceptional because, unlike the protective principle cases,
the "effect test" is not presented as a positive basis of jurisdiction. See Sarkar, supra
note 17, at 69.
32. See Sarkar, supra note 17, at 72.
[Vol. 23
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ognized danger in expanding the territorial principle. As one
commentator has noted, "case[s go] too far when 'jurisdiction'
is assumed over foreigner's foreign agreements, merely be-
cause it has been possible to allege some effects on United
States imports or exports, and because the agreement would
have been illegal if made in the United States."3 3 The ques-
tion which continues to arise over use of this theory is to what
extent is an effect on the United States necessary to make the
exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.
This very consideration would be at issue if the expanded
territorial principle were to be adopted for use in space. With
crews of mixed nationality functioning in a non-sovereign
arena, there is a possibility the United States would suffer
only minor consequences from, and have little real interest in,
a particular incident of criminal conduct in space. In addition,
the interests of the United States may be no greater than
those of another country. Other nations may charge the
United States courts with overreaching when issuing indict-
ments to foreigners for crimes which do not, in their view,
substantially affect the United States.
To summarize, the territorial principle fails as an appro-
priate doctrine under which to assert jurisdiction in space for
three reasons. First, it is generally inapplicable since territo-
rial boundaries in space are not yet demarcated and space
cannot be possessed as sovereign territory. Second, without an
expansive application, the territorial principle is too narrow to
cover crimes with foreign elements. Third, if applied too ex-
pansively, it can be employed dilatorily as a pretext to reach
matters not legitimately within the court's dominion.
B. Nationality Principle
Several jurists express the view that the nationality prin-
ciple is the most expedient means of achieving comprehensive
and satisfactory jurisdiction over extraterrestrial criminal ac-
tivity" because it is a principle widely recognized by the
33. Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Anti-trust
Laws, 33 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 146, 175 (1957).
34. Interview with former NASA attorney, George P. Sloup, Esq., a member of
the Illinois Bar and of the Astrolaw Societies of White's Inn, a private space law
research center (May 1982). The Inn, and its space law orientation, is described in
Vilkin, Space Law, 2 CALIr. LAW. 30 (1982).
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United States and foreign courts.3 5 It avoids the inherent
"overreaching" problems of the territorial principle in as
much as it can be applied to a citizen anywhere he acts. While
a rule with such inherent simplicity is very attractive at first
blush, it nevertheless has considerable shortcomings when ap-
plied to activities in outer space. Itsmajor failure is its inabil-
ity to provide a nation with jurisdiction over a non-national
even though the nation, for example, the United States, might
have legitimate legal interests in prosecuting the criminal
under its law.36 In addition, even where a nation claims an
individual to be its national, international law maintains that,
in certain instances, other nations may disregard that status
for purposes of jurisdiction. 7 Grounds for this disregard are
founded on the rationale that the nation claiming the individ-
ual as its national and asserting jurisdiction has failed to show
a demonstrable bond of attachment between it and the indi-
vidual." This situation might arise where a nation confers the
status of national on an individual after a crime or a politi-
cally sensitive event has occurred."
35. See S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 10, at 55.
36. This would typically occur where, for example, the foreign national commits
a crime onboard a U.S. spacecraft. The U.S. may have a particular interest in prose-
cuting because the crime occurred during the unique circumstances of a U.S. space
mission, U.S. nationals were witness to the crime, relevant evidence remains with the
U.S. space vehicle, or the crime impacts substantially on U.S. interests.
37. See generally Nottebohm Case (Lichtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955 I.C.J. 4.
38. Id.
39. Nationality can be conferred by a nation for political reasons. Raoul Wal-
lenberg, Swedish Ambassador to Hungary during World War II, had arranged for the
issuance of false Swedish passports for thousands of Hungarian Jews to aid them in
their flight from the invading Nazis. At the end of the war, when the Soviets entered
Budapest where Wallenberg was posted, he disappeared and has not been officially
located since. Soviet prisoners and exiles who have since emigrated to the West have
claimed to have knowledge that Wallenberg has been detained or imprisoned in the
Soviet Union, but these allegations remain unsubstantiated.
The United States conferred nationality upon Wallenberg after the war in order
to motivate the Soviets to respond to the United States' efforts to locate him, but, as
noted, the tactic failed to achieve its intended purpose. See generally Lester &
Werbell, LAST HERO OF THE HOLOCAUST, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1980 § 6 (Magazine) at
20.25.
Nationality has also been revoked for political reasons. For instance, after the
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, the Soviet government denationalized all nationals
living abroad who had opposed or who were considered to have opposed the Bolshe-
vik regime. In 1941 Germany denationalized all German Jews residing outside Ger-
many. Italy revoked all nationalizations granted to Jews after January 1, 1939 (during
the Fascist regime). See generally P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1979).
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A final problem with the nationality principle is that it
can cause a defendant to be subject to prosecution under two
penal codes. For example, if a United States astronaut were to
commit a crime onboard a foreign vehicle, he would, by virtue
of his citizenship, be answerable to United States courts and
principles of law, yet he would likely also be triable by the
foreign country under its laws, assuming that country's juris-
diction covers criminal acts by foreigners onboard its vehicles.
The United States and the foreign country would seemingly
have concurrent jurisdiction. The question of which forum
would prevail is, perhaps, a matter of comity, yet as one legal
critic has commented,
application of the nationality principle, even with moder-
ation, contains grave potential dangers .... Jurisdiction
on this basis may, therefore, develop parallel to jurisdic-
tion on a territorial basis, and an individual who has com-
mitted an act regarded as criminal by both the state of
his nationality and the state of the locus delicti may be
tried twice for the same act, even though the municipal
laws of both States forbid double jeopardy.40
To recapitulate, the nationality principle suffers from a
dichotomous problem regarding its application to extraterres-
trial assertion of jurisdiction. On the one hand, it is too nar-
row to secure a nation's jurisdiction over non-nationals visit-
ing or residing in its spacecraft or platforms. On the other
hand, it can be so broad as to make possible jurisdiction over
persons in whom a nation has no definite interest. It can also
cause tension in international relations because two or more
countries may have concurrent jurisdiction.
C. Protective Principle
The protective principle seems, at first glance, to solve
the inadequacies of both the territorial and nationality princi-
ples. Jurisdiction invoked under this principle can reach a
spacetraveler irrespective of his nationality or the situs of the
The conferring of the status of a national by the United States upon a defecting
Russian cosmonaut might serve as an example of a potential problem occurring in
outer space wherein such a situation might arise. Indeed, such a prospect, although
unlikely, could arise in the course of a United States-Soviet "link-up" of their respec-
tive vehicles in outerspace. See also infra note 76 and accompanying text.
40. See Sarkar, supra note 17, at 64-65.
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crime. The principle looks to the nature of the interest injured
to determine jurisdiction. Its employment is generally justified
by nations or a state on the ground of the right to self-de-
fense. One commentator has explained its adoption into law
thusly: "With regard to crimes and delicts against the security
of the State, every State attributes an extraterritorial compe-
tence to itself and arrogates to itself the right to deal with
similar crimes and delicts even when they are committed on
foreign territory."' 1
The advisability of adopting the protective principle for
purposes of asserting jurisdiction in space is that it mandates
that courts review the circumstances of the criminal act to de-
termine if the crime has sufficient impact on that nation's in-
terests to justify jurisdiction. Court review in such instances is
highly advantageous since the unknowns of outer space and
the nature of man's role there make it difficult for anyone to
define in advance what national interests will be affected by
criminal conduct off the earth's surface. Certainly, it is more
desirable for courts to assert jurisdiction by evaluating the
pertinence of the affair to the nation, rather than to mechani-
cally apply a formula based on the site of the crime or the
nationality of the actor.
In the past, however, the protective principle has been ex-
tended by courts in a boundless fashion.' For example, rather
than establishing a standard to determine when the impact of
a crime justifies the assertion of the jurisdiction of the United
States, courts have found such jurisdiction in an arbitrary
fashion. One commentator has disapprovingly noted that
"[wihile the principle is soundly based and now generally ac-
cepted it is subject . . . to extravagant extensions of state
power."' s
This outcome greatly reduces the principle's serviceability
in space. Since the principle can be applied without con-
forming to objective standards, international conflict may oc-
cur when a nation attempts to claim jurisdiction over a non-
national astronaut whose criminal activity allegedly affects
that nation's interests."' Although the causes are different, the
41. Sarkar, supra note 17, at 68 n.80 (1965) (quoting Stenuit, La Radiophonie
et le Droit International Public, 137 (1932)).
42. See Sarkar, supra note 17 at 69.
43. Id. at n.86 (quoting P. JEssuP, TRANSNATIONAL LAw 43 (1951)).
44. About an analogous area, one author comments, "[t]he United States has
[Vol. 23636
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same result was demonstrated to show the ineffectiveness of
the nationality principle. As was previously pointed out, crews
of United States spaceships are expected to be composed of
persons from many nations.4 5 If the United States were to as-
sert jurisdiction over a foreigner without calling into question
the propriety of the act, it must do so in accord with well-
defined and accepted prescripts. The United States must not
act arbitrarily, and the requisites for its claim of jurisdiction
must not be so politically malleable that it may be called a
mere pretext for intervention." On these grounds, the protec-
tive principle is distinctly unfit. Indeed, the use of the princi-
ple has been characterized as an unrestrained exercise of sov-
ereignty in disregard of international principles. 47 The theory
underlying the principle has similarly been criticized, as well
as its untempered employment by the courts, in that it is dif-
ficult to draw "a hard-and-fast rule once one accepts the pro-
tective principle."4 8
The protective principle also presents to the United
expanded its delimitation of legal authority to allow the assertion of legal control over
economic arrangements centered in other states. Such practice is notable especially in
the area of anti-trust regulation. It has occasioned protest." R. FALK, THE ROLS OF
DoMEsTIc COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER 36 (1964). For a survey of the leading
cases, see U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS REPORT 66-01 (1955).
45. Article 7(f) of the Spacelab Agreement states that the United States will
provide Spacelab flight crew opportunities to nationals of the European Space
Agency countries involved in the space programs. See generally Mossinghoff & Sloup,
Legal Issues Inherent in Space Shuttle Operations, 6 J. SPAcE L. 47, 56 (1978) (cit-
ing to Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and Cer-
tain Governments, Members of the European Space Research Organization, for a Co-
operative Programme Concerning the Development, Procurement and Use of a Space
Laboratory in Conjunction With the Space Shuttle System, executed at Neuilly-sur-
Seine, August 14, 1973, entered into force for the United States, August 14, 1973, 24
U.S.T. 2049, T.I.A.S. No. 7722 (Spacelab Agreement)). Since the conclusion of the
agreement, the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) has been succeeded
by the European Space Agency (ESA), which remains bound by the Spacelab
Agreement.
46. "States, by characterization, are able to extend the traditional reach of thejurisdictional principles, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d
416, 439-48 (2d Cir. 1945) (territorial principle); Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecu-
tions, [1946] A.C. 347 (nationality principle). These decisions are intended only to
illustrate the process of characterization at work in rather extreme situations." R.
FALK, supra note 44, at 28 n.24.
47. See Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction over Foreigners for Treason and Offenses
Against the Safety of the State Committed Upon Foreign Territory, 19 U. PITT. L.
REv. 567, 568 (1958).
48. P. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 51 (1959).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
States the problem that if the nation adopts it, not only inter-
national disagreements may result, but United States astro-
nauts may be the subjects of unexpected and unfounded
claims of jurisdiction by other nations. After all, turnabout is
fairplay, especially in international politics. 9 History reveals
that reciprocal action has repeatedly been a method for one
country to discipline the disfavored conduct of another coun-
try.50 It has been urged that this could "encourage states to
delimit their jurisdictional competence in accord with stan-
dards of reasonableness ' 51 and that in international law, it is
often "mutually more advantageous to defer on a reciprocal
basis than it is to assert legal control. '5 2 The purport of such
an interdependent system is that "reciprocal patterns can pre-
serve a desirable legal order . . ."5 Since the protective
principle does not lead to stable international relations, it
should be rejected as the method for establishing jurisdiction
in outer space.
D. The Universality Principle
The universality principle, although a recognized basis for
extending domestic criminal jurisdiction extraterritorially,
must be summarily dismissed because it cannot provide com-
prehensive criminal jurisdiction in space. The universality
principle, by definition, applies to a small class of crimes
which are cognizable under international law as crimes against
mankind or crimes affecting the interests of all states in gen-
eral.54 Piracy is the oldest example of a crime punishable by
any nation and the only crime uniformly recognized under the
49. Retortionary measures within the domestic jurisdiction of the com-
plaining state such as trade or financial discriminations or embargoes of
merchant vessels are not contrary to international law and may be used
to bring pressure for the rectification of legal injuries. . . .Efforts may
even be made to induce other states to cooperate. . . .Measures of this
kind, however, are likely to militate to the. . . disadvantage of all con-
cerned rather than to rectify the wrongs complained of.
Wright, Non-Military Intervention, in THE RELEVANCE OP INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1971).
50. See generally R. FALK supra note 44, at 46.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 46.
53. Id.




principle. 55 The list of enumerated universal crimes can be en-
larged by international agreement or custom, of course, but
even that obscure possibility would not cause a body of law
equivalent to that applicable under section 7 of Title 1856 to
be effective in space. The principle should not suffer total
abandonment, however. It may be utilized in those unusual
cases in which a universally-cited crime is committed
extraterrestrially.
E. Passive Personality Principle
The passive personality principle is also a basis for assert-
ing jurisdiction which can be summarily dismissed as being
inadequate to handle the jurisdiction within outer space. As
described earlier, this principle permits a nation to exercise
jurisdiction over a non-national if the criminal act committed
substantially affects the person or property of a citizen of that
nation or state.5 7 The theory of the principle is widely ac-
knowledged, but United States courts categorically deny its
operation in American law.58 The United States has even
strongly objected to its use by other nations as a means of
asserting jurisdiction over American citizens."
In summary, the five traditional principles discussed
above are each inadequate in varying respects, to place space-
travelers and their activities under a canopy of criminal juris-
diction. It is the enormous and unprobed place of outer space
that challenges the limits of conventional legal devices and
thought and makes it necessary for a more modern concept of
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction to be developed.
III. THE NEW AMENDMENT TO THE SPECIAL MARITIME AND
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION ACT
The Amendment" is the latest attempt by Congress to
create a unique jurisdictional model capable of handling the
problems involved in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction in
55. S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 10, at 55 n.146.
56. 18 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West Supp. 1981).
57. See Harvard Research on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, supra note 5,
at 480.
58. 2 MOORE, The Cutting's Case, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 231-40 (1906).
59. See S. LAY & H. TAUBENPELD, supra note 10, at 55-56.
60. 18 U.S.C.A. § 7(6) (West Supp. 1981).
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outer space. While the Amendment properly circumvents reli-
ance on the existing models just discussed, and thus avoids
their inherent pitfalls, it was drafted with such imprecision
and ambiguity that it is very likely to generate as many
problems as it eliminates.
A. History of the Amendment
The Amendment was distilled from jurisdictional con-
cepts found in two proposed Senate bills, the Criminal Justice
Reform Act of 197561 and the Criminal Code Reform Act of
1977.6" The authors of the 1975 and 1977 proposed Acts were
specifically concerned with modifying the criminal code to
provide for criminal jurisdiction in outer space. The Senate
Judiciary Committee's Report on the proposed Act of 1975
stated:
[T]here still remain areas where no sovereign can yet be
said to have established jurisdiction. Examples are such
places as Antarctica and outer space. It is in these areas,
and other areas as yet uncharted, that there exists both
an interest and a legitimacy in the exercise by the United
States of extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons for the
purpose of effectuating an arrest.
The exercise of such arrest jurisdiction is limited to of-
fenses described in section 204 (Extraterritorial Jurisdic-
tion) and to fugitives from justice where the offender or
the fugitive is outside the jurisdiction of the United
States and outside the jurisdiction of any nation."
The proposed Acts each provided for circumstances in which
United States' federal jurisdiction would attach extraterritori-
ally for criminal acts. Two of those circumstances which were
referred to in both proposed Acts are relevant to the United
States Space Shuttle and other manned space programs."'
Under either proposed Act, jurisdiction would attach where:
(i) the offense is committed by or against a national of
the United States at a place outside the jurisdiction of
61. S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
62. S. 1437, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
63. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., CRIMINAL
JUSTICE REFORM AcT OF 1975, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED
STATES SENATE TO ACCOMPANY S. 1 35-37 (Comm. Print 1975).





(ii) the offense is comprehended by the generic terms of,
and is committed under circumstances specified by, a
treaty or other international agreement, to which the
United States is a party, that provides for, or requires the
United States to provide for, federal jurisdiction over
such offenses."
However, neither the 1975 Justice Reform Act nor the 1977
Criminal Code Reform Act were ever enacted into law.66
When the proposed Acts failed, lawyers at the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration warned that the events
which came to pass in a troublesome international incident in
1970 could be repeated in outer space. 7 In United States v.
Escamilla," jurisdiction over a murder committed outside the
territory of the United States, in international waters, was
barely confirmed by the courts. Defendant Escamilla was a ci-
vilian technician working with other civilian and United
States military personnel on "T-3" or "Fletcher's Ice Island,"
an island in the Arctic Ocean. 9 In an argument over a vat of
raisin wine, Escamilla used his bear rifle to fatally shoot a col-
league in the chest.70 The question of jurisdiction confounded
officials immediately.71 No one was certain if an ice island was
sufficiently similar to "ships, boats, rafts, and debris" to fall
under the Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the
United States, 18 U.S.C. section 7.72 Jurisdiction was found by
the United States District Court at the trial,78 yet at no time
did the judge state the basis for his decision on the jurisdic-
tional issue. The Fourth Circuit, en banc, was divided by
65. Id.
66. S. 1630 is the latest criminal code reform bill which Congress failed to enact.
Following its predecessors, S. 1630 included an excellent statement of extraterritorial
jurisdiction applicable to space. See S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc.
9770-76 (1981).
67. Interview with former National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) attorney, George P. Sloup, Esq. (May 1982). See also supra note 34; Note,
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Arctic Ice Islands: United States v. Escamilla, 4
U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 419 (1975).
68. 467 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1972).
69. Id. at 343.
70. United States v. Escamilla, 210-70-A (E.D. Va. 1971).
71. See Holmquist, The T-3 Incident, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC. 45, 49, 50, 53
(Sept. 1972).
72. Id. at 52.
73. United States v. Escamilla, 210-70-A (E.D. Va. 1971).
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equally on the issue of jurisdiction. As a result, the district
court's holding of jurisdiction was affirmed on appeal. 4
Escamilla reaffirmed the need for legislation concerning
extraterritorial jurisdiction, of which both NASA and the De-
partment of Justice were aware. 75 The unprecedented success
of both the space shuttle program and joint manned space
ventures between nations7' made the need for that legislation
all the more immediate. It was obvious that in the future peo-
ple of different nations would be working and residing in
space, a vast jurisdictional void. 77 Sadly, EscamiUa further ev-
idenced the fact that even societies' most highly trained tech-
nicians, working on specialized projects, are capable of com-
mitting criminal acts in such settings.
Rather than amending the Criminal Code directly, either
with an entirely new act or by adopting a version of one of the
1975 or 1977 proposed Acts, Congress chose instead to pass its
new jurisdictional model by attaching it to a NASA appropri-
74. In his appeal, his first contention that the district court was in error
when it ruled that the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States extended to crimes committed on T-3 is one upon which
the in banc [sic] court is equally divided and so we affirm the district
court's exercise of jurisdiction.
467 F.2d 341, 343.
75. Neil Hosenball, General Counsel for NASA, testified:
Questions regarding criminal jurisdiction on the Shuttle have been
raised in the course of NASA testimony before these subcommittees the
last two years. Our response was that, if the legislation on criminal code
reform pending before the 96th Congress matured into law, the need for
specific legislation to address this problem would be obviated. However,
because the legislation on criminal code reform was not passed by the
last Congress and flights of the Shuttle will be occurring in the near
future, we recommend that the matter be resolved now. The amendment
was drafted by NASA in close consultation with the Department of Jus-
tice and it has their approval.
Hearings on H.R. 1257 Before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Appropria-
tions of the House Committee on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. 2601
(1981) (statement of Neil Hosenball, General Counsel, NASA).
76. The 1975 hook-up of an American and Soviet manned spacecraft is known
as the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. That great achievement in astrotechnology and
global coordination is destined to become standard practice in the years ahead.
77. Gaps in jurisdiction have occurred in other contexts and resulted in the in-
ability to prosecute criminal offenders. For example, in United States v. Cordova, 89
F. Supp. 298 (D.N.Y. 1950), defendant Cordova was charged with assault of passen-
gers and crew members of a United States airplane while it was flying over the high
seas between Puerto Rico and New York. The Court arrested its judgment of convic-
tion because it held there was no jurisdiction to try the case under The Special Mari-
time and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1976). See also
infra note 91 and accompanying text
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ations bill.75 While this new model, the Amendment, borrowed
much of its language from the 1975 and 1977 proposed Acts,
the two very provisions of those Acts specifically written to
cover United States criminal jurisdiction in outer space were
omitted. 9 What language the Amendment did borrow from
the proposed Acts was actually from a section originally writ-
ten to cover United States jurisdiction over crimes occurring
on "special" aircraft.80 Undoubtedly, Congress envisioned that
a space vehicle was similar enough to a "special" aircraft to
consider the jurisdiction provided by that section to be
sufficient.
The Amendment itself was considered to have such lim-
ited application that it was added as a sixth provision to the
catchall category of the special maritime and territorial juris-
diction of the United States."1
78. See supra note 3.
79. See S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204(h)(i) (1975); S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 204 (i)(j) (1977).
80. The Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977 defined a special aircraft as:
(1) an aircraft that belongs in whole or in part to:
(A) the United States;
(B) a state or locality;
(C) an organization created by or under the laws of the United
States or of a state.
(2) a civil aircraft of the United States, as defined in secion 101 of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended (49 U.S.C. 1301);
(3) any other aircraft with the United States;
(4) any other aircraft outside the United States:
(A) that has its next scheduled destination or last point of de-
parture in the United States, and that next lands in the United
States; or
(B) that has an "offense," as defined in the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of aircraft, committed aboard,
and that lands in the United States with the alleged offender still
aboard; and
(5) any other aircraft leased without crew to a lessee who has his prin-
cipal place of business in the United States, or, if the lessee has
no principal place of business, who has his permanent residence
in the United States;
during the period that such aircraft is in flight, which is, for the purpose
of this subsection, from the moment when all the external doors of such
aircraft are closed following embarkation until the moment when any
such door is opened for disembarkation, or, in the case of a forced land-
ing, until a competent authority takes over the responsibility for the air-
craft and for the persons and property aboard.
S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
81. 18 U.S.C.A. § 7(6) (West Supp. 1981).
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B. The Amendment: Too Much Space Between the Lines
The Amendment provides for jurisdiction over:
[A]ny vehicle used or designed for flight or navigation in
space and on the registry of the United States pursuant
to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Includ-
ing the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the Conven-
tion on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space, while that vehicle is in flight, which is from the
moment when all external doors are closed on Earth fol-
lowing embarkation until the moment when one such
door is opened on Earth for disembarkation or in the case
of a forced landing, until the competent authorities take
over the responsibility for the vehicle and for persons and
property aboard. '
This language presents a conservative solution to the problem
of extending criminal jurisdiction to space. In classifying
spacecraft as "special" United States jurisdictional territory,
it mandates that United States law cover all persons and acts
committed aboard.88 Providing for jurisdiction by designating
particular areas as "special territory" is not a new practice.
Section 7 of Title 18, the Special Maritime and Territorial Ju-
risdiction of the United States, 4 already defines five other
places to which United States criminal law applies, although
those places are outside the territory of the United States."8
The main thrust of the Amendment is to make much of
the federal criminal code operative within the space vehicle,
not just those few specific statutes containing express grants
of extraterritorial jurisdiction or those in which a court deter-
mines that Congress intended extraterritorial application."
82. Id.
83. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 7(6) (West Supp. 1981), reprinted supra note 4, at § 7(6).
See also infra text accompanying note 81.
84. 18 U.S.C.A. § 7(6) (West Supp. 1981).
85. Id.
86. Dr. J. Henry Glazer, Chief Counsel for NASA-Ames, poses the question
whether terrestrial criminal codes can logically be extended in their entirety to outer
space since he suggests that some behavior deemed criminal on earth may be less
offensive, possibly necessary, or even appropriate in outer space. Dr. Glazer postu-
lates that survival-homicide may become an accepted practice during space missions
of long duration where, for example major casualty to the spacecraft's oxygen system
means some must be sacrificed if any are to survive. Moreover, he believes some acts
which are laudable on Earth may be deemed criminal in space. For instance, child
bearing in a gravityless state may cause severe birth defects, leading lawmakers to
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The Amendment grants jurisdiction over a space vehicle
which is on the registry of the United States pursuant to the
Outer Space Treaty and the Convention on Registration while
the vehicle is in flight, which is from the moment when all
external doors are closed on Earth following embarkation un-
til the moment when one such door is opened on Earth for
disembarkation. 7 This list constitutes the definition of the
special territory in space to which United States criminal ju-
risdiction attaches.
1. A Space Vehicle
The definition is seriously flawed by its failure to provide
criminal jurisdiction beyond the space vehicle's portals. The
limited scope of this definition is of particular importance be-
cause in 1967 the United States became a party to the Outer
Space Treaty,88 which strenuously maintains that space and
the celestial bodies are not capable of national appropria-
tion.s ' To remain consistent with the Treaty, the United
States must avoid any suggestion that it considers space gen-
erally to be United States territory, or that the place occupied
by spacecraft aloft is to be deemed United States territory.
But limiting jurisdiction to the vehicle raises serious practical
problems. Missions increasingly explore the ability of man to
function outside the confines of the spaceship. Shuttle astro-
nauts, for example, are now routinely equipped with ex-
travehicular mobility units and trained to perform a variety of
tasks in open space.' 0 Since, in the past, courts have construed
the Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction narrowly,'
prohibit, under pain of penal sanction, pregnancies in space under other than rigidly
controlled conditions. Interview with Dr. J. Henry Glazer at White's Inn (Sept. 1982).
See also supra note 4.
87. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 7(6) (West Supp. 1981).
88. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
89. Id.
90. Some Unsuitable Workmanship, Tisz 68 (December 20, 1982).
91. See United States v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp. 298 (D.C. N.Y. 1950). The issue
in that case was whether 18 U.S.C. § 7 was broad enough to cover an airplane flying
over the high seas: The Court interpreted the statute narrowly to hold that an air-
plane is not a "vessel" within the meaning of the statute and that "upon the high
seas" does not include the airspace over them. In consequence of this case, the statute
was amended to include aircraft. Act of July 12, 1952, ch. 695, Pub. L. 514, 66 Stat.
588 (1952) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 7(5) (1976)). The statute was later
amended to extend United States criminal jurisdiction to apply to acts committed in
outer space. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 7(6) (West Supp. 1981). See also supra text accompa-
nying notes 3-4.
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it is likely that the courts today will interpret the Amendment
similarly, resulting in jurisdiction being strictly limited to acts
committed within the vehicle itself. Extravehicular activities
appear, therefore, to be beyond the reach of the present juris-
dictional grant.
Similarly, conduct on the surface of a celestial body, if
undertaken outside the spacecraft which is landing or has
landed on a celestial body, will not be within the scope of the
statute. This jurisdictional gap is undesirable because there is
no reason to believe that criminal conduct cannot occur in
open space or on some celestial body.2
Another problem with limiting jurisdiction to the vehicle
involves the possibility of criminal conduct occurring on ob-
jects fabricated in space itself. A shuttle-type spacecraft has
the facility to carry objects into space and to support the as-
semblage there of new vehicles, space stations, and satellite
centers."8 Some commentators talk of harnessing the resources
of the planets to do large scale mining and construction
projects.'4 Facilities made in space likewise appear to be be-
yond the scope of the new Amendment because, as with ex-
travehicular activities discussed above, they are not contained
in the "space vehicle" definition of special United States
territory.
The Amendment contains additional problematic terms.
For example, as has already been demonstrated, criminal ju-
risdiction does attach to a space vehicle because Congress
mandated that space vehicles are "special" United States ter-
ritory." It is uncertain, however, whether foreign craft tempo-
rarily docked to United States space vehicles will be within
the province of United States courts. Further, it leaves unex-
plained the jurisdictional reach of United States courts over
United States astronauts committing crimes while they are
aboard foreign space vehicles, or over foreign astronauts who
commit crimes aboard foreign space vehicles docked to United
92. Space walks and planet exploration could be prime arenas for criminal con-
duct since crimes committed there may be beyond the observation of witnesses.
93. See generally Holub, Star Labs: Scientists Give NASA Designs for Space
Colony, San Jose Mercury, Nov. 30, 1982, at 1E, 4E.
94. See generally INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DOING BUSINESS IN SPACE: LE-
GAL ISSUES AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR Asso-
CIATION (1981).




It is unlikely that such docked spacecraft can reasonably
be considered within the scope of the Amendment merely as a
result of short term contact. However, if life support systems
are intermingled for any appreciable length of time, and if
United States launched astronauts have free run of the
docked spacecraft, there is greater reason to view the attached
spacecraft as "special" United States territory for purposes of
jurisdiction."
Obviously, however, foreign states will undoubtedly ob-ject to having their spacecraft considered special United
States territory. Thus, political constraints could make it im-
possible, for example, for the United States to exercise juris-
diction over American astronauts who commit crimes just
outside the doorjamb of the United States spacecraft. Even
greater problems of jurisdiction will exist if the criminal actor
is not a United States national."
2. Registration
The significance of registration as referred to in the
Amendment98 raises the issue of whether the mere listing of a
space object on some national registry should entitle the na-
tion of registry to jurisdiction and control over the object. Ifjurisdiction automatically attaches by registration, the United
States may be inclined to include on its registry space objects
over which it has no logical right to exercise continuing legal
authority. For example, the United States, as an advanced
space power, may be commissioned by less advanced nations
to launch their objects. These objects may be foreign built and
foreign manned, and they may eventually return to territory
outside the United States. It is unreasonable for the United
States to exercise jurisdiction over such objects simply be-
96. Id.
97. Furthermore, it is likely that many spacecraft which temporarily dock
alongside U.S. craft will operate under foreign registry. The express terms of the
Amendment preclude the extension of U.S. criminal jurisdiction to vehicles not on
the registry of the U.S. Thus, even where political considerations might not interfere
with the power of the U.S. to reach criminal conduct occurring on a docked foreign
spacecraft, the status of that spacecraft would likely prevent the U.S. from taking
action. Such a limitation is unfortunate because it would simply be the result of poor
legal draftsmanship and would have nothing to do with the real interest which the
U.S. may have in the criminal act or actors.
98. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 7(6) (West Supp. 1981).
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cause they were launched by the United States and thereby
came to be listed on the United States registry. Jurisdiction
should not necessarily be tied to the act of registration since
the rationale for registration may be quite different from the
rationale for exercising jurisdiction.
While it is understandable for the United States to limit
its interest in space vehicles to those that are on the United
States registry, the Amendment goes so far as to exclude from
jurisdiction unregistered United States spacecraft. It seems
obvious that government constructed vehicles will be regis-
tered, but under the Amendment, privately owned and oper-
ated space enterprises, which are rapidly approaching launch
capability, can send manned vehicles into space without regis-
tering them with the United States government.9 If such pri-
vate efforts proliferate and become more sophisticated, many
future space travellers may be on board craft lacking registra-
tion and thus outside the protective quilt of United States
laws.
The Amendment's statement of jurisdiction, which fails
to comprehend an entire class of vehicles, is probably contrary
to the jurisdictional directives of the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty.100 Article VI and article VIII of the Treaty can be
read together to mean that nations shall retain jurisdiction
over their own national activities in space.' 0' The Treaty ap-
pears to mandate that nations bear responsibility for the con-
duct of their nationals, irrespective of whether they operate in
official or unofficial capacities. Presumably, the goal is to en-
sure order in space by subsuming private activities under the
authority of the state. The Amendment fails to conform to the
prescripts of article VI and article VIII. It is ironic in light of
the fact that the Amendment predicates jurisdiction on com-
pliance with the Outer Space Treaty and the Convention on
Registration.0 2 Apparently, the Amendment's terms are in-
99. The Federal Aviation Administration must first be notified in order to clear
the airspace, and permission for the incidental transmission of any telemetry must be
obtained from the Federal Communications Commission. The National Aeronautics
and Space Administration itself, however, has no authority over such private launch-
ings. See Mossinghoff & Sloup, supra note 45 at 66.
100. See Outer Space Treaty, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347,
610 U.N.T.S. 205.
101. There remains, however, the threshold question of whether the Treaty is
meant to pertain to criminal as well as civil jurisdiction.
102. See G.A. Res. 3235, I U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 16, U.N. Doc. A/9631
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consistent. Its reference to the Outer Space Treaty suggests
that the United States subscribes to the Treaty mandate that
nations retain jurisdiction over all national activities in space,
yet the Amendment limits United States jurisdiction to regis-
tered United States spacecraft. Unless the registration refer-
ence is deleted or additional laws are passed making registra-
tion of space vehicles compulsory, current domestic law will
fail to give effect to this international agreement, which the
United States is bound to support. In addition to the legal
inconsistency, United States domestic law may be inoperative
to resolve troublesome disputes which may occur if foreign na-
tions demand the United States take responsibility for events
involving unregistered spacecraft. 03
3. In Flight: The Door Test
Another problem with the Amendment is that jurisdic-
tion attaches to a space vehicle only when it is in flight. 04
Oddly enough, the new law defines flight as "the moment
when all external doors are closed on Earth following embar-
kation until the moment when one such door is opened on
Earth for disembarkation . ". .., Under this definition, the
"door test," it is possible for jurisdiction to be based on the
most trivial of justifications. The following example is illustra-
tive. If a space vehicle is privately owned, launched from pri-
vate property in a state of the United States, and its astro-
naut committing the crime is a citizen of that state, the
vesting of state or federal jurisdiction would turn on whether
the vehicle's door was closed. If the door is open at the time of
criminal conduct, the vehicle is not legally "in flight" and fed-
eral criminal jurisdiction cannot attach. However, if the door
is closed when the crime is committed, the vehicle, whether
moving or stationary, is technically "in flight" and covered by
federal criminal jurisdiction. Were technical malfunctions
prior to takeoff to occur, the questions raised border on the
absurd. For example, the door could be opened and closed
several times over a period of hours while adjustments were
being made. At which closing is the door officially "closed" for
purposes of jurisdiction? What if the "door" is closed but
(1974).
103. See also supra note'97.
104. 18 U.S.C.A. § 7(6) (West Supp. 1981).
105. Id.
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other means of access to the vehicle remain open? There ap-
pears no need nor is it desirable, for federal jurisdiction to
attach while the vehicle is, in fact, grounded, since state law
properly governs criminal acts occurring within the State. The
"door test" is therefore not only arbitrary, but leads to con-
flicts between state and federal prosecutorial interests.
The "door test" is equally awkward in determining when
federal jurisdiction ends. Jurisdiction under the Amendment
is maintained until "one such door is opened on Earth for dis-
embarkation. '" 10 6 This language indicates that the opening of
the external door must combine with the intent to disembark
from the spacecraft, or jurisdiction under the Amendment
does not terminate. Such a statement of jurisdiction is unnec-
essarily vague. For example, it is unclear whether the disem-
barkation of goods as well as persons will trigger the termina-
tion of federal criminal juirisdiction. In any case the result is
arbitrary since it should not matter for purposes of jurisdic-
tion whether the vehicle is grounded for disembarkation, re-
fueling, maintenance, or some other reason. Once the vehicle
touches down on state territory, whether its external doors re-
main closed or open for any reason, continuing jurisdiction
under the Amendment is concurrent with state jurisdiction
and potentially conflict producing.
The very unnatural definition of "flight" in the Amend-
ment may cause further negative consequences. For example,
jurisdiction under the Amendment may neither attach to a ve-
hicle constructed in space nor to a vehicle carried into space
with its external doors open and extraterrestrially introduced
for service. In both cases, the space vehicle obviously flies, yet,
under the Amendment, it cannot be considered "in flight" be-
cause it will never have closed its external doors on Earth.
The anomolous result is that the vehicle and its passengers
remain outside the control of the United States courts.
4. Forced Landing
The final provision covers jurisdiction during a forced
landing. "Special" jurisdiction over the vehicle will continue
in the case of a forced landing until competent authorities
take responsibility for the craft and its crew. 107 Several issues
106. Id.
107. See 1S U.S.C.A. § 7(6) (West Supp. 1981).
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are raised by these terms. First, the term "forced landing" is
not defined.10 8 Second, the Amendment fails to adequately
consider the situation where the United States spacecraft is
forced to land in foreign territory or territory over which no
nation has jurisdiction. In the first instance, the foreign nation
will have concurrent jurisdiction with the United States from
the moment the spacecraft enters the sovereign's territorial
airspace. In the second instance, should a foreign nation reach
the downed vehicle first, it could claim jurisdiction over it.109
That concurrence of jurisdiction will continue until United
States special jurisdiction terminates, when competent au-
thorities take responsibility for the craft and its personnel.1
It is not customary for the United States to assert jurisdiction
over criminal acts occurring on foreign soil. Foreign govern-
ments may object to such a practice on the grounds that it
infringes on their exercise of sovereign power.
Third, the Amendment fails to define the term "compe-
tent authority." This may be quite consequential, as several
authorities may claim responsibility for a spacecraft. Govern-
ment ships will likely be retrieved by the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration or the Department of Defense.
Privately launched vessels may be claimed by their owners, or
by the state of registry of the vessel, or by the state whose
citizens comprise the crew. When crews are international, au-
thorities from many countries may be interested in taking re-
sponsibility for the vehicle, persons, and property aboard. Be-
cause the Amendment fails to define the authority concerned,
it leaves United States jurisdiction in dispute. Since special
United States jurisdiction terminates once the authority takes
responsibility for the vehicle, it is crucial to designate the in-
tended authority in order to establish the moment at which
special jurisdiction ends.
Finally, the Amendment fails to define the term "taking
responsibility." ' This phrase can be interpreted to mean an-
108. One recognized definition of a forced landing is "a landing made because of
engine failure or bad weather." 17 Words and Phrases 358 (West 1958) (citing to
McCallum v. Executive Aircraft Co., Mo. App., 291 S.W.2d 650, 657).
109. An example which readily comes to mind is one in which a space vehicle is
forced down in international waters, a foreign fishing ship takes the vehicle under tow
or brings the astronauts aboard ship, and a crime occurs before competent authorities
take control of the space vehicle and its crew.
110. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 7(6) (West Supp. 1981).
111. Id.
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ything from acknowledging ownership of or control over the
craft, to completing its retrieval. The ambiguousness of the
phrase impacts significantly on the question of jurisdiction
since jurisdiction terminates the moment authorities "take re-
sponsibility" for the craft. Under the present version of the
Amendment, it is impossible to know when the crew of the
spacecraft is no longer amenable to United States prosecution
following a forced landing.
IV. JURISDICTION BASED ON THE MINIMUM CONTACTS
PRINCIPLE
It is an inescapable conclusion that the Amendment is in-
adequate for the task of extending criminal jurisdiction to
outer space. Criticism of the Amendment's major provisions
reveals that it is dangerously unworkable because it provides
incomplete jurisdictional coverage, it encourages conflict be-
tween state and federal law and between United States and
foreign laws, and it is vague and confusing. The Amendment
fails not only by the inadequacies of its separate provisions. It
fails just as the traditional principles of criminal jurisdiction
fail, principally because it links the existence of jurisdiction to
a single factor. In the Amendment, jurisdiction is based solely
on a spacecraft being in flight. A better model of jurisdiction
must consider several factors because, as this comment dem-
onstrates, the question of jurisdiction in space presents an un-
usually complex set of possibilities.
A preferable theory for extending criminal jurisdiction to
outer space is to predicate jurisdiction on the principle of
minimum contacts. The nature and degree of the accused's
connection with a nation" 2 and the interest the nation has in
the subject matter of the offense should determine the exis-
tence of jurisdiction. Courts' rulings should result from the
application of a balancing test in which several specific factors
are decisively poised against each other. It is the purpose of
this section of the comment to establish why the minimum
contacts principle should be adopted by the United States as
its basis for criminal jurisdiction in matters involving outer
112. For the purposes of this comment, the word "nation" will hereinafter be
used to refer either to a state of the United States or to a nation such as the United





The minimum contacts approach diverges from the main,
and deficient, characteristic of the Amendment and of the
traditional principles in that it does not isolate a single ration-
ale to explain why a nation may assert legal control. Its sug-
gested adoption is premised on the belief that "there exists an
obvious need to enlarge the framework of inquiry beyond the
Harvard Research formulation,""11 if, in the complex setting
of space, jurisdiction is not to be unresponsive to novel inci-
dents nor unaccountable to the relevance of international in-
terdependence and reciprocity.
The history of the Outer Space Treaty 14 teaches that
control over space will not, in the foreseeable future, be relin-
quished by sovereign nations to an international authority.1"5
As a result, there is great urgency for a national legal author-
ity in space to be well-defined, comprehensive, and yet flexible
enough to accommodate the emerging patterns of extraterres-
trial interaction between nations. The minimum contacts
principle can naturally function as the conduit for a message
to other nations regarding the responsible attitudes toward
the duties of a judiciary in outer space. It requires courts to
justify their assertions of jurisdiction in light of specific con-
siderations. This will encourage other nations to take a simi-
larly reflective approach when adjudicating matters concern-
ing a United States citizen or concern." 6 One commentator
113. R. FALK, supra note 44, at 54.
114. See supra note 26.
115. In June 1959, The United Nations Ad Hoc Committee (of the Technical &
Legal Subcommittees) debated whether international control was necessary, owing to
the danger to the rest of the world of abuses of the use of space. The Ad Hoc Com-
mittee concluded against investing authority in a specially created international
agency or even in an existing agency. The United States insisted on "modest propos-
als" to meet only the most pressing concerns. In 1962, when the United States offered
to act as a world-clearinghouse of space information, the USSR objected. That same
year, the proposal that advance consent be obtained from countries concerned about
possibly harmful uses of space lacked a consensus. In 1964, negotiations regarding the
rules for the rescue and return of astronauts saw the United States and Soviet Union
divided over the rights of international organizations to act independently of their
member countries. The Treaty on Rescue and Return was realized in 1967 only be-
cause the parties agreed not to include express provisions regarding the forum for the
settlement of disputes. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty also leaves the solution of dis-
putes to normal diplomatic channels. See S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 10, at
214-38.
116. See R. FALK, JURISDICTION, IMMUNITIES, AND AcT OF STATE: SUGGESTIONS
FOR A MODIFIED APPROACH, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION 9 (1961).
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has observed that "this is especially serious for the interna-
tional legal order because it relies heavily on self-delimitation
and possesses only very marginal techniques to reconcile in-
consistent national claims of legal competence."'1 17
A. The Components of Minimum Contacts as Developed
By Domestic and International Law
The concept of establishing the minimum contacts princi-
ple as the standard criterion for determining extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction is unique. However, the use of the princi-
ple to determine jurisdiction has substantial precedence in
United States civil law and international law. Since 1945, with
International Shoe v. Washington,' 8 federal law has consist-
ently held that the amenability of a party to suit is based on
the party's connections with the forum state. In International
Shoe, the United States Supreme Court stated that the due
process clause of the United States Constitution119 requires a
minimum contacts balancing test. The Court stated,
Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon
the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the
fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was
the purpose of the due process clause to ensure. That
clause does not contemplate that a state may make bind-
ing a judgment in personam against an individual or cor-
porate defendant with which the state has not contacts,
ties or relations.1 20
Eight years later, in Lauritzen v. Larsen,12 1 the United
States Court of Appeals utilized a similar balancing test in de-
ciding to not apply United States law in a case involving a
foreigner and a transaction occurring primarily outside the
United States."' Although the issue in Lauritzen was not ju-
risdiction but choice of laws,128 the Court's reasoning is none-
theless germane.
First, the Court in Lauritzen noted the inability of the
territorial principle to comprehend misconduct arising in an
117. R. FALK, supra note 44, at 54.
118. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
119. U.S. CONST., amends. V and XIV.
120. 326 U.S. at 319.
121. 345 U.S. 571 (1952).
122. Id. at 592.
123. See id. at 573.
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international setting. Justice Jackson asserted that "the test
of location of the wrongful act or omission, however sufficient
for torts ashore, is of limited application to shipboard torts,
because of the varieties of legal authority over waters she may
navigate."'" Having dispensed with the territorial principle as
a means of designating the choice of law, Justice Jackson
listed seven factors which influenced the Court's ultimate de-
cision. The considerations include: 1) The place of the wrong-
ful act; 2) the law of the vessel's flag; 3) the allegiance or dom-
icile of the actor; 4) the allegiance of the affected party; 5) the
place of contract; 6) the inaccessibility of a foreign forum; and
7) the policy of the forum asserting jurisdiction.' 5 This check-
list is plainly applicable to the weighing of contacts which this
comment advocates as the suitable process for finding crimi-
nal jurisdiction in outer space.
Justice Jackson's opinion provides a useful guideline for
such a balancing process regarding incidents occurring in
outer space. His opinion is also relevant with reference to
outer space because he warns that in an international sphere,
it is not a wholesome equilibration to base jurisdiction on the
mere sufficiency of contacts. " Foreign interests likely to be
affected by assertions of United States power must be consid-
ered as a threshhold matter. In words that are strikingly
adaptable to law dealing with events in outer space, he cau-
tions that, "[i]f, to serve some immediate interests, the courts
of each were to exploit every such contact to the limit of its
power, it is not difficult to see that a multiplicity of conflicting
and overlapping burdens would blight international carriage
by sea.' 21 7 The minimum contacts principle proposed for ap-
plication to events in outer space must include this concern
for foreign interests if it is to promote the peaceful and pros-
perous exploitation of the galaxy.
Significantly, a source of authority other than case law in-
terprets jurisdiction in terms of minimum contacts. The Re-
statement (Second) Conflicts of Law offers this definition: "A
state may create or affect legal interests whenever its contacts
with a person, thing, or occurrence are sufficient to make such
action reasonable. The power to create or affect legal interests
124. 345 U.S. at 583.
125. See generally id. at 583-90.
126. 345 U.S. at 581-82.
127. Id.
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is 'jurisdiction' as the term is used in the Restatement of the
subject." 2 ' The Restatement formulation confers discretion
upon the courts to base jurisdiction on the contacts calculus
in a setting, like space, where more than one legal authority is
operative.
International law has also recognized the minimum con-
tacts principle as a proper basis for jurisdiction. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice'2 9 has specified that the following fac-
tors should be weighed to determine the existence of
jurisdiction under its "Link Test:"
Different factors are taken into consideration, and their
importance will vary from one case to the next: the habit-
ual residence of the individual concerned is an important
factor, but there are other factors such as the center of
his interests, his family ties, his participation in public
life, attachment shown by him for a given country and
inculcated in his children, etc. '30
In the famous case of Lichtenstein v. Guatemala (the
Nottebohm Case),' 3' the International Court of Justice found
that the nation of Lichtenstein had no standing to invoke the
jurisdiction of the International Court because Lichtenstein
had no true bond of attachment to the individual on whose
behalf the claim was made.'32
The court asserted that a nation can only invoke the ju-
risdiction of the International Court of Justice for the purpose
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 42(1) (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1956).
129. The International Court of Justice is the
[j]udicial arm of the United Nations. It has jurisdiction to give advisory
opinions on matters of law and treaty construction when requested by
the General Assembly, Security Council or any other international
agency authorized by the General Assembly to petition for such opinion.
It has jurisdiction, also, to settle legal disputes between nations when
voluntarily submitted to it. Its judgments may be enforced by the Secur-
ity Council. Its jurisdiction and powers are defined by statute, to which
all member states of the U.N. are parties. Judges of such court are
elected by the General Assembly and Security Council of U.N.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 732 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
130. Nottebohm Case (second phase) (Lichtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955 I.C.J.
Rep. 4.
131. Id. at 22.
132. Lichtenstein, claiming the wealthy Mr. Nottebohm as its national, insti-
tuted proceedings against Guatemala before the International Court of Justice to re-
cover restitution for unlawful measures taken by Guatemala against the economic
interests of Nottebohm. Id. at 40-41.
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of redressing the claims of a private person when the nation
acts on behalf of its national. " As a rule, international law
has left the determination of national status to the nation as-
serting jurisdiction. Thus, it has been sufficient for interna-
tional jurisdiction for the claimant nation to prove that the
subject individual is a national according to its domestic law.
In the Nottebohm Case, however, the International Court of
Justice made a dramatic departure from the tacit acceptance
of nationality claims. It held that, henceforth, to invoke the
jurisdiction of the International Court, a claimant nation has
to prove nationality by asserting strong factual ties linking the
individual and the nation.""
The International Court's use of the "Link Test" in Not-
tebohm is relevant to the extension of criminal jurisdiction to
outer space because it indicates a tacit approval in interna-
tional law for the minimum contacts principle of jurisdiction.
B. The Functional Superiority of Minimum Contacts
Jurisdiction
While it is clear that the new law is unfit to provide fair
and comprehensive criminal jurisdiction in space, it remains
to be demonstrated that the principle of minimum contacts is
functionally superior. This can best be shown by applying the
minimum contacts principle to the very fact patterns which
confound the jurisdiction under the Amendment.
The first factual incidents that are problematic under the
Amendment concern conduct in space which takes place
outside the confines of the space vehicle. Most obviously un-
comprehended by the Amendment are the following: 1) ex-
travehicular activity; 2) activity aboard objects fabricated in
space; and 3) activity outside the vehicle on a celestial body.
The minimum contacts principle presents no problem in
reaching criminal acts in any of the above circumstances. The
situs of the act is but one factor the court must consider in
determining whether to exercise jurisdiction. "' If one refers
back to the list of factors Justice Jackson cited in Lauritzen v.
Larsen,' 6 it becomes apparent that the place of the wrongful
133. Id. at 20-21.
134. Id. at 22.
135. See generally supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
136. 345 U.S. 571 (1952).
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act is of primary concern to the Court. A nation obviously has
a great interest in exercising jurisdiction over a criminal act
occurring inside its own spacecraft because the crime most
likely involves its nationals and impacts upon its interests.
There may be slightly less reason to exercise jurisdiction over
a crime occurring outside the craft, yet the court may assert
jurisdiction because other factors, such as the nationality of
the actor or the effect of the crime on national interests, weigh
in its favor. Thus, the court must substantiate that the United
States, for instance, has some legitimate interest in conduct
occurring outside the spacecraft sufficient to support the exer-
cise of jurisdiction.
A more complicated problem is presented by the situation
in which a foreign vehicle temporarily docks alongside a
United States spacecraft. The Amendment provides the
United States has jurisdiction over a visiting foreigner who
commits a crime onboard a United States vehicle,37 but it
does not have jurisdiction over a United States national who
commits a crime onboard a foreign craft."8' This result is an
arbitrary conclusion because it has nothing to do with the
United States' interest in the criminal act or actor. Rather
than mechanically applying the law, the minimum contacts
principle demands that the court evaluate the reasons the
United States may have to assert jurisdiction over a person,
whether he or she acts on a United States or foreign space-
craft. Where the offender is a United States national acting
onboard a foreign vehicle, the Court may exercise jurisdiction
as long as it can show good cause for doing so.
This may, of course, potentially give United States courts
and a foreign sovereign concurrent jurisdiction over the same
crime. Under the minimum contacts principle, however, the
United States may choose to refrain from exercising jurisdic-
tion where it sees that the foreign sovereign has greater inter-
est in prosecution. This is, as Justice Jackson advised, because
relevant foreign interests likely to be affected by assertions of
United States power must be considered as a threshold mat-
ter. 189 Additional factors found relevant by the International
Court could also be persuasive, though not binding, on a
137. See supra note 97 and text accompanying notes 95-97.
138. Id.
139. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 581.
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United States court making such a determination.
A third category of problems is presented by the possibil-
ity that people will be onboard unregistered spacecraft. The
Amendment is incapable of reaching crimes that occur on un-
registered spacecraft.140 The minimum contacts principle
would allow jurisdiction, however, where the court finds that
an unregistered vehicle and the criminal actor aboard it have
a significant connection to the United States, provided it is
not unreasonable for the court to exercise jurisdiction.
Conversely, while the registration of a vehicle to the
United States will likely weigh in favor of United States juris-
diction, there may be cases in which another forum is more
appropriate. This may be true when foreigners obtain United
States registration as a flag of convenience, in order to circum-
vent restriction on their enterprise or to escape disadvanta-
geous tax and regulatory laws operative in their own coun-
tries. Their criminal activities in space, even aboard a United
States registered ship, may offend their country of origin more
than the United States. The United States court could defer
from invoking jurisdiction in such a case.
A fourth problem under the Amendment is that, because
of its unnatural definition of flight, jurisdiction attaches under
the Amendment while the vehicle is grounded but has its door
closed.'41 Thus, federal and state jurisdiction overlap when
there is a private launch from a private facility. This is en-
tirely avoidable under the minimum contacts principle. The
federal court would simply have no reason to assert jurisdic-
tion over acts occurring in state territory where the federal
government had only a minimal link with the actor or the act,
and no strong constitutional grounds for asserting its
jurisdiction.
A final problem is raised by the possibility that the space-
craft will be forced to land unexpectedly. The Amendment
provides that jurisdiction will continue until competent au-
thorities take responsibility for the spacecraft and its person-
nel. This is too vague a basis on which to predicate the court's
power. Further, United States law and foreign law may con-
flict if the spacecraft lands in foreign territory and criminal
140. See supra notes 99-100 and 102-03 and text accompanying notes 99-103.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 103-06.
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acts are committed there. " 2 The minimum contacts principle,
however, provides a firm and sensible basis for the assertion
of jurisdiction in such circumstances. It allows the court to
evaluate the very unique instance of a forced landing and to
decide on the facts whether, and at what point, the United
States has such an interest in the criminal act that it may
justifiably prosecute.
The minimum contacts principle can accommodate the
problem of concurrent United States and foreign state(s) ju-
risdiction because it is equipped to register the interest of the
foreign sovereign(s) and to compare it to the interest of the
United States. The United States court may justify the exer-
cise of its jurisdiction when it evinces a substantial interest in
the criminal conduct, or greater interest that any other forum.
V. CONCLUSION
Three important points emerge from this analysis. First,
the Amendment does not accomplish the goal of providing
comprehensive jurisdiction over criminal acts committed ex-
traterrestrially. Second, further efforts to predicate criminal
jurisdiction on the traditional principles will also be inade-
quate because the principles themselves are inappropriate for
use in the problematic environment of space. Third, the mini-
mum contacts principle is the superior basis for jurisdiction,
provided the judiciary carefully defines the contacts calculus
and applies the principle in light of its impact on United
States international relations.
Justice Miller said, over a century ago in The Slaughter-
House Cases,14 8 that,
A privilege of a citizen of the United States is to demand
the care and protection of the Federal Government over
his life, liberty, and property when on the high seas or
within the jurisdiction of a foreign government. Of this
there can be no doubt .... 14
When Justice Miller wrote of the extraterritorial reach of the
United States courts in 1873, he could never have seriously
imagined extending jurisdiction to outer space. If he were
writing today, however, the learned Justice would likely say it
142. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
143. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
144. Id. at 79.
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is a person's privilege to be legally protected, and the United
States has a duty to provide adequate legal protection both on
and off the surface of the Earth.
Karen Robbins

